By ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ (GREEK) TÜRKÇE (TURKISH)
In December 2016, on December 4 specifically, after the “dramatic” interruption of the negotiations in Mont Pelerin – a period of intense backsliding and contradictory positions – in an article in which we recorded the dead ends we had trapped ourselves in, we noted the following: “Nicos Anastasiades is emerging as the fateful face of History. The person to whose “lot it fell” to solve the Cyprus problem. One way or another.” Either by reaching an agreement capable of securing the approval of the Greek Cypriots, or by a definitive deadlock with uncharted consequences. To understand the backsliding of the period, it suffices to recall that a day later, on December 5, Nicos Anastasiades justified his return to the talks (preceded by the dinner of December 1 with gourmet chops) citing… blackmail! “…Taking into account the rhetoric of the Turkish president, instead of seeing another 26,500 become or be ‘naturalised’ as nationals of the illegal regime, instead of seeing the danger of a possible decision allegedly by the Turkish Cypriots for integration, I chose to enter into a dialogue”…
In light of what had tragicomically preceded this, the goal and aspirations were now clear, as to where our acrobatic stunts, clumsiness and flawlessly executed backward rolls were leading. Hence, long before the new round of negotiations in Crans-Montana began and without waiting to see how they would develop, we expressed the view that the Cyprus issue was now over. Not definitively (that’s another illusion of the status quo advocates who think this is the end of the road), but as we’d known it to date. And that those with delusions that any change to the basis of a solution would lead to the fulfilment of their groundless aspirations had another thing coming. Although, between us, we never believed in good intentions… What followed – in addition to the “brainstorming” about two states which the president also shared with Cavusoglu – simply confirmed the truth of our impressions. The chicanery that has ensued since, unimaginable. Nikos Kotzias, for example, in his interview with CyBC in November 2020, said: “On Thursday night”, “we went to dinner satisfied as we thought we had got everything we wanted.” That is, the abolition of guarantees and intervention rights, which Mevlut backtracked on. Remember what Antonio Guterres noted in his report: “By the end of the conference, the sides had reached practically full agreement on the federal executive and effective participation.” And refer back to Anastasiades’ statements from July 2007 onwards (Translator’s note: a possible typo, with the author likely meaning to write 2017). To see the intensity with which he demonised all the parameters of a solution and the convergences, and all those (elements) on which “there was full agreement”, which supposedly, if Cavusoglu had not gone back on the guarantees and intervention rights, everything would have been milk and honey. We understand each other, I think.
Nicos Anastasiades’ term ends in a few months. The legacy he is leaving is the tombstone of the Cyprus problem, the fınal partition, the two states. And the most tragic thing is that no one seems to care. His potential successors prefer, when they are not bragging about ineffective patriotism, not to touch this hot potato, so as not to chase away votes. And the “number one national problem” is no longer, not even ostensibly, a criterion for collaborations and alliances.
Elefthera, 3.7.2022.
Source: ANASTASIADES’ LEGACY
