ARE THERE PROSPECTS FOR A CYPRUS SOLUTION? ONLY WITH IDEAS ‘OUTSIDE THE BOX’

The President has repeatedly stated we must start where we left off at Crans-Montana. Yet he has never shown any inclination to explain precisely what that position means.
How ready is President Christodoulides for a Cyprus solution? The truth is, his endless public statements suggest he’s willing to engage in talks. But ready for an actual solution—meaning sitting down to thrash out the final outstanding details—he clearly isn’t. Not yet. The same holds for Tufan Erhürman, who visited Ankara and managed, if nothing else, to leave without absolute verbal alignment with Erdoğan. The new Turkish Cypriot leader succeeded in maintaining his pre-election promises for immediate resumption of negotiations, obviously for a federal solution—though he didn’t name it—yet he too knows the obvious: no Turkish Cypriot leadership can negotiate seriously without Turkey’s political cover. And that is the biggest problem with resolving the Cyprus problem. Everyone agrees Turkey naturally has interests to pursue and defend both in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean more broadly. On the other hand, no one—not even the Turkish Cypriots—seems willing to see those interests turn the Republic of Cyprus into a subordinate state to Ankara after a solution. The aim right now is for Cyprus (G/C-T/C) to deepen its connection with the EU, not fall under the control of a massive country that’s not far from being classified as third world.
Turkey
Turkey, as we speak, doesn’t seem to grasp this. What’s more, the current political climate doesn’t put the Cyprus issue anywhere near the top of its to-do list. To be fair, Cyprus is now—unlike during 2015-17—seen as part of a bigger puzzle, a card in the grand geopolitical poker game playing out across the region. For Turkey today, the immediate priorities are: Gaza, the Syrian problem, Ukraine, the political and economic relationship it wants to build with the EU, what comes next in Iran, managing the Kurds, joining the new European defence doctrine SAFE, and, of course, navigating Donald Trump’s new and highly interventionist foreign policy. Turkey wants to be a guarantor power in Ukraine and Palestine, presents itself as a pillar of stability in Syria and northern Iraq, is trying via Qatar to extend its influence into the Emirates, and has achieved an enviable penetration into Africa.
Its regional policy, mind you, has serious weaknesses—chiefly around how predictably it behaves towards the West. This stance makes it harder for Turkey to integrate further into European political and economic institutions. Domestically, democracy is in short supply. Nearly all of Erdoğan’s political opponents are in prison, and opposition media face persecution. The economy’s growing at a decent pace (3.5%), but inflation remains sky-high (forecast around 34.9% for 2025) alongside significant macroeconomic imbalances—massive lira devaluation, high interest rates, and a widening current account deficit (imports versus exports).
In short, Turkey is, comparatively speaking, a powerhouse in the region—but with serious vulnerabilities that realistically limit the scope of its ambitions. Facing it in the Middle East: Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states. To the west: Cyprus, Greek-Turkish relations, the hostility of many European countries over its support for Russia, and Washington’s fury that it’s violating the embargo and selling Russian gas to the West through its pipelines.
Christodoulides
Nikos Christodoulides has read the international environment reasonably well, and with Cyprus’s upcoming EU presidency as his spearhead, he’s trying to create facts on the ground that he believes can shift some balances in Cyprus’s favour.
On his watch, with Russia out in the cold internationally, Cyprus has fully embraced Glafcos Clerides’s position that “we belong to the West”. Cyprus is now a reliable EU partner and a predictable US ally, with Christodoulides going a step further by pushing for Cyprus to join NATO. NATO membership is a move that concerns the Cyprus problem too, since it takes Turkish guarantees off the table.
During his meeting with German Chancellor Merz, the Cypriot President made some PR-friendly overtures towards Turkey, mentioning he’d invite Tayyip Erdoğan to the European Council meeting in Cyprus, whilst setting some conditions for further Turkish-EU cooperation.
But everything Nikos Christodoulides is doing isn’t enough. Cyprus doesn’t have the size or political influence to trigger geopolitical developments without bigger players involved. At the same time, the Cypriot President isn’t convincing anyone he’s ready to enter a final phase of Cyprus negotiations—because he’s never once shown any willingness to explain what exactly he means by his stated position that we should start where we left off at Crans-Montana. To become convincing, he needs to do two things:
First, explain precisely where we left off. If he accepts the Guterres framework and the discussions around it, that means specific things. It means a rotating presidency, Turkish Cypriot political equality with effective participation in governance. Meaning the vote of one Turkish Cypriot minister, at least on matters where the Turkish Cypriot community has a fundamental interest. What remained pending was defining which issues would be subject to that effective vote at Crans-Montana. We’re talking about a list prepared by negotiators Mavroyiannis and Nami, verbally confirmed in 2019 before António Guterres at the Anastasiades-Akıncı meeting in Berlin. Also pending: the joint decision-making mechanism between the President and the Vice-President in case of disagreement, with efforts focused on finding a dispute resolution mechanism. The issue of establishing a timeline for ending guarantees in Cyprus hadn’t closed either—whether it would be a sunset clause or include some review provision. Is the Greek Cypriot leader ready for all this, or when he says he wants to start where we left off, does he just mean the process?
Second, he needs to stop the almost comical political encirclement—or rather isolation—of Turkey through gas pipelines, electricity cables, trilaterals, and 3+1 meetings. He’d be far more convincing if instead he created a technical committee on energy matters with Turkish Cypriot participation to discuss the entire Cypriot EEZ (north and south), giving our country more credibility. Through this committee, we could even invite Turkish companies to drill in the Cypriot EEZ. At the same time, discussions about the viability of the cable (GSI) would be far more realistic if Turkish Cypriots were factored into the equation as electricity consumers. A technical committee could be set up for water too, since the problem is massive for both sides.
Erhürman
Equivalent moves could come from the Turkish Cypriots—if Turkey agreed, of course. Imagine a Turkish company drilling in the Republic of Cyprus’s EEZ whilst simultaneously opening Varosha to Greek Cypriots, even under UN administration. Imagine Ercan Airport gaining international recognition whilst, based on the map submitted in Geneva, territory began returning to Greek Cypriot refugees below the old Nicosia-Famagusta road.
We have an almost complete picture of the final Cyprus problem solution. What’s missing are ideas for moves that can change the flow of events. Ideas that could be implemented gradually (over three years, say) to lead safely to a referendum where everyone votes YES.
If there’s no immediate prospect for starting Cyprus negotiations—which there doesn’t appear to be—Mr Erhürman seems satisfied with some confidence-building measures mainly involving opening checkpoints. Under the circumstances, that’s probably the only option available for now.
They are not enough
CBMs can be useful, but, sadly, they can’t change the flow of events. They can’t overturn the unacceptable status quo, can’t lead to Cyprus’s reunification. To turn the world around takes serious work, requires leaders with political will who’ll generate game-changing ideas. The crisis and fluidity created by the two wars haunting the region show enormous dangers lurking for all of us. We need leaders, in short, who’ll stop getting lost in the small picture. But so far we don’t seem to have them—to the point where quite a few people now believe, judging by a question we posed on the Politis website, that only Trump can find the solutions.
This article was first published on 16.11.2025
Source: ARE THERE PROSPECTS FOR A CYPRUS SOLUTION? ONLY WITH IDEAS ‘OUTSIDE THE BOX’