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Everyone seems perfectly content with the status quo.
The Cyprus problem as we’ve known it does not exist anymore. Never mind the tired mantras about “a solution within the UN framework” or “resuming talks where we left off at Crans-Montana”—the reality is something else entirely. Wednesday’s trilateral meeting proved it: a complete failure that couldn’t manage even the smallest step forward. The two leaders couldn’t even agree on a joint communiqué, whilst the indefinite postponement of the five-party conference signals not stagnation but regression.
Two factors are shaping things at the moment. One is political, the other procedural. Let’s start with the procedural—it’s the easier of the two, though no less decisive. There’s clearly an understanding between Nicosia and Ankara, however unspoken, that nothing substantive can happen during Cyprus’s EU Presidency. Which means the Cyprus problem goes into cold storage until June. And then what? Then we’ve got less than six months before António Guterres hands over the keys to the UN to his successor. He’ll be the sixth UN Secretary-General to leave without achieving the slightest progress—the slightest—on Cyprus. And he’s one of the few who actually engaged meaningfully with our national problem.
From the procedural, we move to the purely political, which is directly connected to . At a time when the UN’s role is being questioned and Trump is trying to set up his own alternative “organisation,” Guterres’s departure will mark a serious setback for any solution efforts.
Given all this, let’s examine why the Cyprus problem isn’t the same anymore. Cyprus has unmistakably become embroiled in the region’s wider geopolitical game. This certainly has its upsides—it enhances the country’s role. But it has its downsides too, the moment Cypriot interests become aligned with, or influenced by, the interests of other states. The Greece-Cyprus-Israel alliance strengthens our country under current conditions. But it also constrains us WITHIN those current conditions. Israel would never want to see Cyprus in a federal model where Turkey would have indirect influence—through the Turkish Cypriots. The proximity of the two countries (Cyprus and Israel) demands loyal and partly subservient friends, not enemies. At least that’s how Netanyahu sees it—and he didn’t hesitate (even if no one will confirm it) to intervene with Nicos Anastasiades during the Crans-Montana talks.
Given these realities, there are two scenarios. The optimistic one says Turkey will eventually grasp that it needs to adjust its policies, respecting international law and the interests of all states in the region. And thus integrate itself—as an equal partner, mind you, not as the boss—into the broader energy plans and European policies. But that would mean the thunderous collapse of the “Blue Homeland” narrative and the leading role it claims in the region and beyond. In such a case, the Greek-Turkish disputes, the Cyprus problem, and the Eastern Mediterranean issues could all be resolved as a package deal.
Unfortunately, we now come to the second scenario. The times we’re living through don’t permit such optimistic assessments. Quite the opposite, in fact. When the occupation of Ukrainian territory by Russia is being legitimised, and American interventions in other countries become routine, the international political scene appears to be moving to the rhythm of extreme arrangements. The kind where recognising a state born of invasion and occupation doesn’t sound quite so discordant to the ears of the present political moment. And the longer a crisis drags on without bothering anyone, the logic of “if you can’t untie it, cut it” will emerge as the only feasible option—if and when it lands on the agenda of those with the power and means to impose something.
Especially when in Cyprus there’s no genuine attempt at meaningful contact and cooperation between the two communities that would create the momentum for a reunited homeland. Instead, everyone seems perfectly content with the status quo.
This article was first published on 01.02.2026
