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Over the past week, Nikos Christodoulides made yet another appointment from the DISY party. This time, the new Commissioner for the Protection of Personal Data is Maria Christofidou, an active DISY member and the head of the party’s Nicosia branch. This is the latest move in Christodoulides’ ongoing effort to attract DISY members by giving them positions, a strategy designed to drive a wedge between DISY members and win them over. It also confirms his long-term goal: Which is to bind either beneficiaries or disgruntled DISY members to his chariot for 2028.
This practice is politically unacceptable, if not outright unethical. By using government appointments and state mechanisms, Christodoulides is essentially trying to co-opt a party (that he himself claims is his own). However, this strategy is also tactically flawed. It carries immense risks, while the potential gains are limited and have a low ceiling. First and foremost, this approach deepens the rift with the largest party in the country and burns the last bridges for any potential future cooperation, even in the second round of the next presidential election. It’s clear that DISY has no choice but to permanently distance itself from the government, as this tactic makes a full-blown confrontation a matter of survival for the party. While Christodoulides may succeed in drawing in a specific faction of DISY—perhaps 10-20% of the party—he is simultaneously turning the entire DISY machine against him, as the presidency is now seen as the party’s number one threat.
Why his attempt to seize control of DISY does not serve his 2028 goals.
At the same time, his decision to disregard the governing coalition parties is causing a permanent rift with those who currently support him. The belief is growing within these parties that they are bearing a massive political cost by being part of an unpopular government, without seeing any return in the form of appointments or positions. Already, many voices are calling for a reassessment of their relationship with the government, citing both practical reasons (political attrition) and matters of principle. The obsession with “utilising” DISY members is only expected to fuel these reactions and strengthen the calls for a withdrawal from the government, creating more issues of communication and trust within an already troubled administration. Most importantly, this strategy makes any future cooperation almost impossible. You can’t ignore the fact that voices are already shaping the nature of this impending split, such as the proposal by Nikolas Papadopoulos’s close associate, Chrysis Pantelidis, for cooperation with DISY. This brings to light the options for the next day. It’s clear that the image is being formed of a President who cannot be trusted, by either the opposition or his own coalition. Nikos Christodoulides is heading for a clash with everyone, and all for the sake of winning over 15-20% of DISY, which translates to a 5-6% of the total electorate.
This rift becomes even more intense—and now includes the vast majority of society—due to his implicit cooperation with ELAM, which he is now also providing with members. This choice also carries huge risks and has a low ceiling for gains. It’s unlikely that such an alliance could be made official, at least in the first round of the election (while an unofficial, behind-the-scenes arrangement probably won’t be enough to get him to the second round). ELAM built its brand on being anti-establishment and is seen by a large part of society as the party opposing the system, a characteristic it won’t want to lose by supporting an unpopular government. An open alliance wouldn’t suit Christodoulides either, as it would alienate all other parties and a huge part of the public, even in a second-round run-off. His trump card, after all, on which he based his election, was his independence and his moderate rhetoric. A clear alliance with ELAM would significantly limit his pool of support to the far-right.
In 2023, Nikos Christodoulides needed the support of all the so-called “centrist” parties, 20-25% of DISY voters (with Anastasiades and his inner circle supporting him at least indirectly), and the majority of unaligned voters he had convinced that he represented something new. At the same time, ELAM’s support against the AKEL candidate was what ultimately elected him. Currently, with the centrist parties on the verge of leaving the government, DISY forced into a state of open conflict with him, and his public image suffering constant damage, he would need at least 50% of DISY’s support and a number of other circumstances just to make it to the second round. Or an open alliance with ELAM from the first round. Neither of these scenarios seems likely. This is why his strategy is tactically disastrous: it is essentially leading him into a head-on collision with both his allies and his opponents, leaving him with no options for 2028.
This article was originally published on 21.09.2025
