With the informal multilateral talks coming to a close, the Cyprus issue is entering a new phase of negotiations. A phase that international actors are hinting will bear no resemblance to the direction the discussions have taken since 2017. After all, Guterres would not have embarked on such a process on the eve of his retirement if he were not willing to push things toward a genuine final effort—one that increasingly looks like a last chance. The question is whether Nikos Christodoulides has realised what process he is entering into and to what extent he is prepared for the difficult decisions he will inevitably have to make in the coming period.
Throughout the past period, the G/C side has appeared to benefit from Ersin Tatar’s presence at the helm of the T/C community. Without substantive talks, with the Cyprus issue limited to the opening of a few checkpoints, and facing a man who questioned the basis for a solution and constantly raised obstacles even to the mere discussion of the issue, Nikos Christodoulides was able, free from any “baggage,” to build a profile marked by “major victories” and forge alliances for his reelection. All he had to do was reiterate his willingness to resume talks. Without his intentions being put to the test. Nor his limits.
Today, however, the reality is very different. The UN appears to be setting aside the CBMs, and preparing to delve into the Cyprus issue. The new T/C leader, despite attempts by media outlets aligned with the President to discredit him, has already expressed his readiness for talks based on the Bizonal Bicommunal Federation framework, and appears to be succeeding in bringing into the discussions issues that will test Nikos Christodoulides, such as political equality and timelines. At the same time, Turkey, which sees its international influence steadily growing, will attempt to create new circumstances that will serve its plans. It knows that Nikos Christodoulides does not accept half of the points in the Guterres framework that he says he is ready to negotiate, just as it knows that he does not want tight timelines. Above all, however, it knows that he will have trouble promoting a BBF solution with political equality, given that the parties aligned with him and the overwhelming majority of his supporters reject (directly or indirectly) the BBF, and with him banking on ELAM as the vehicle that can keep him in power. All Turkey has to do is push developments to a point that will force the G/C side to take a stand, shifting the difficult decisions onto our side and attempting to steer us toward either a final plan or a report assigning blame. The presence of Erhurman—as a new politician who supports the BBF—serves this purpose. It is therefore a given that the rhetoric Nikos Christodoulides has adopted over the past period will be put to the test at the negotiating table. His intentions will be put to the test as well.
The Cyprus issue has turned, especially since 2004, into a blame game that served the short-term, petty political ambitions of the leaders of the day. Free from pressure and deadlines, they were able to appeal to their domestic audiences and manipulate the national issue through communication tactics, without ever taking responsibility for where it was headed. Nikos Christodoulides has also chosen to play this game in recent times. The next process, however, cannot be reduced to a blame game. Quite simply because what is at stake will not be the next attempt, but the Cyprus issue itself. What Erhurman is proposing—namely, that if the talks collapse this time as well, the day after cannot be the same—is what is now being said in international circles. That the discussion of the Cyprus issue, in the event of another breakdown, cannot continue as is. Another breakdown—without a clear statement that we did everything we could to reach an agreement, or, even worse, with blame being placed on our side—could easily bring an end to the cycle of efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue as we know it. The consequences could reach levels that are difficult for us to assess today.
That is why Nikos Christodoulides, who says he is pleased that a new effort is in the works, must be prepared to negotiate seriously and honestly—without resorting to political posturing. The G/C side cannot afford to let this lead to yet another failure. Above all, however, it cannot afford to be the one held responsible for it down the line. The Cyprus issue is entering a new phase, one that will bear no resemblance to the first three and a half years of his term. If Nikos Christodoulides focuses on the domestic audience or on the upcoming elections, he will most likely emerge as a tragic hero. For he will not be faced with yet another missed opportunity. He will, in all likelihood, face definitive division—with all that this entails—both for the country and for himself.
Source: THE LAST CHANCE
