STALEMATE AS A CHOICE AND HOW LEADERS ARE TRAPPING THE SOLUTION

written by ANDREAS PARASCHOS | PHILELEFTHEROS | February 19, 2026

There are moments in the history of a problem where inaction isn’t weakness—it’s strategy. The Cyprus issue appears to be in precisely such a phase. The settlement process isn’t collapsing spectacularly; it’s just sinking methodically. Leaders on both sides profess commitment to a solution, invoke the “convergences up to Crans-Montana,” communicate with the UN Secretary-General—and at the same time can’t even agree to open a checkpoint that would make people’s daily lives easier.

The question is no longer whether we’re stuck. We are. The question is whether this impasse is failure or a comfortable equilibrium for the political and economic elites on both sides of the line. And the second, even more critical question: if this continues, will Cyprus remain a low-intensity regional issue, or will it be dragged, inevitably, to the big table of Middle Eastern deals—where solutions aren’t designed according to law but according to power dynamics?

The word “convergences” has been doing the rounds again in recent weeks. It’s presented almost as some mysterious material that needs to be… discovered, documented, verified. But the basic fact is simple: the convergences up to Crans-Montana aren’t unknown. They’ve been officially recorded. In his report to the Security Council (28 September 2017), António Guterres described with clarity where negotiations had reached: substantial convergence on executive power and effective participation, advanced progress on property and territory, manageable differences on equal treatment, significant progress on security and guarantees within a package framework.

In other words: the UN isn’t talking about “uncharted territory”—it’s talking about the final mile. Yet today, the Greek Cypriot leadership is asking for a fresh process to “record convergences” from scratch, separation of internal and external aspects, confirmations chapter by chapter and part by part. This is a methodology that objectively pushes the discussion back to square one. Not to Crans-Montana, but before it.

Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriot leadership (under Erhürman) demands explicit pre-commitment to political equality, rotating presidency and positive vote, as well as a process with strict timelines and a fallback clause if it fails. In other words: political principle first, negotiation after. Both approaches have one common result: no immediate resumption of substantive negotiation.

The most revealing aspect of today’s deadlock isn’t found in the big chapters—security, guarantees, territory. It’s in the small stuff. The crossing points. The Secretary-General and his envoy María Ángela Holguín asked for one simple, tangible demonstration of political will: opening new crossing points. There was agreement on four. Not one has been implemented. Disagreement over which four turned into total blockage.

The paradox is striking, as documented in a recent analysis by Kyriakos Pierides, Editor-in-Chief of CIReN:

  • 6.5 million crossings in 2025
  • Over 5 million vehicles
  • Hundreds of millions of euros in cross-border commerce
  • Daily human contact that keeps growing

And yet the leaderships can’t open one additional crossing where society is already traversing the boundary en masse. Checkpoints—tools for building confidence—have been turned into bargaining chips for prestige. Each crossing becomes a “trade-off,” a “balance,” a “message to the domestic audience.” Citizens’ daily lives are subordinated to petty political semiotics.

If the two sides can’t agree on a strip of tarmac, how will they agree on distribution of powers, territorial adjustments, and a new security system? The UN has already answered indirectly: it won’t convene a full process without tangible proof of credibility.

The delay tactic is a familiar pattern in Cyprus history: commitment to a solution is declared, a new methodological precondition is added, a new basis is requested, a new document, fresh confirmation. Time passes. Political cost gets pushed into the future. Today, the discussion about “re-recording convergences” could easily drag on for one to two years—brushing right up against the 2028 presidential elections. Similar processes in the past lasted years without substantive negotiation. Meanwhile, Guterres—who came into this problem guns blazing to solve it when he took over at the UN—leaves at the end of 2026, UNFICYP is under fiscal pressure, the UN is now asking for reports with “frank strategic assessments,” international attention is shifting to multiple crises, and the window is closing quietly.

And the question returns: who benefits from the status quo? The status quo isn’t neutral. It produces interests. In the south, political forces that reject the federal solution support government choices, the economy functions without transition risk, responsibility is constantly shifted to the “other side.”

In the north, dependence on Turkey is cemented, new economic and property facts on the ground are created, and a solution becomes a threat to the redistribution of power. On both sides, a solution would reshuffle elites, resources, institutions, control. The impasse is politically safer than the rupture a settlement would require.

The most underestimated factor is that society is moving faster than politics. Crossings are increasing. Bicommunal trade is increasing. Daily contacts are increasing. Economic interdependence, however distorted, is deepening. There’s now a silent social reality of reconnection without a political framework. This creates a new rift—not just between the two communities but between society and leaderships.

And we arrive at the big strategic question: whether Cyprus will remain an autonomous negotiating field or be definitively absorbed into a broader geopolitical equation, as the Eastern Mediterranean is now linked to:

  • Energy corridors
  • Greek-Turkish balances
  • Turkey-West relations
  • Middle East security architecture
  • Maritime zones and infrastructure

The longer Cyprus remains unsolved, the more it transforms from a problem to be settled into a power variable. And when a problem becomes a power variable, it stops being solved with legal tools and gets solved with balance-of-power packages. Then it won’t be put forward to be solved. It’ll be put forward to be “arranged.”

Guterres himself has said he doesn’t want endless processes. He wants results-oriented negotiation. He wants small, tangible steps. He wants credibility. Opening a checkpoint isn’t a technical matter. It’s a political truth test. If even that doesn’t pass, then the message is clear: the impasse isn’t an accident. It’s a choice. And every choice has a cost, even when it’s slow to show.

At this point, leaders’ responsibilities are no longer merely institutional or collective—they’re personal. When a national issue remains static for years, invoking “objective difficulties” stops being enough. Leadership is judged not by declarations of intent but by decisions taken when the political cost is high. And on Cyprus, political cost is systematically avoided.

Personal responsibility arises from three elements: knowledge, choice, omission. Knowledge, because everyone involved knows exactly where negotiations stopped and what the convergence points are. Choice, because they choose methods, terms, and preconditions that slow rather than accelerate the resumption of substantive dialogue. Omission, because they don’t exploit even the small, feasible measures that could create momentum for trust.

When a leader claims to be ready for a solution but won’t take a risk even on low-intensity measures—like crossing points, technical CBMs, joint administrative cooperation—then the contradiction becomes personal. It’s no longer “the system.” It’s the individual’s choice to manage the issue communicatively rather than transformatively.

There’s also the responsibility of political rhetoric. Cultivating expectations without corresponding strategy, leaks that always load intransigence onto the other, insinuations without evidence, constant shifting of blame—all the things that shape a culture of inaction. Leaders know that every word they utter affects the climate. When they choose rhetoric for domestic consumption instead of preparing public opinion for compromise, they assume personal responsibility for the deadlock.

The history of negotiations shows that solutions move forward when leaderships decide to lead, not follow their audience’s fears. Whoever chooses management over decision doesn’t remain neutral. They become part of the problem. And that’s a responsibility with a name and surname attached.

This article was first published on 15.02.2026

Source: STALEMATE AS A CHOICE AND HOW LEADERS ARE TRAPPING THE SOLUTION