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In the climate of deconstruction that’s been set up from the moment the new Turkish Cypriot leader was elected, with the slogan “Tatar or Erhürman—what’s the difference?”, Nikos Christodoulides came along last week to add his contribution. He pointed out that despite his efforts to communicate with Tufan Erhürman, this wasn’t possible, attempting to elevate a matter with no political ramifications into something major and shoehorn it into a blame game. Showing, too, how he intends to approach the Cyprus problem.
Throughout the previous period, the Greek Cypriot side seemed to get comfortable with Ersin Tatar leading the Turkish Cypriot community. With no substantive talks, the Cyprus discussion confined to opening a few checkpoints, and facing a man who challenged the solution basis and constantly threw up obstacles, even to having a conversation, Nikos Christodoulides could—free from any dilemmas—build his profile with “great victories” and alliances for his re-election. All he had to do was keep repeating his willingness to restart talks. His intentions weren’t tested. Nor were his limits.
This changes with Erhürman’s election. The new Turkish Cypriot leader has already expressed readiness for talks on the basis of a bizonal, bicommunal federation, showing intent to bring into discussions issues that will test Nikos Christodoulides—such as political equality and timeframes. At the same time, Turkey—whose international influence is continuously growing—will try to create new realities serving its plans. It knows Nikos Christodoulides doesn’t accept half the points from the Guterres Framework he claims ready to negotiate. It knows he doesn’t want tight timetables, and that he’ll struggle to push through a BBF solution with political equality, with his coalition partners and the overwhelming majority of his supporters rejecting BBF and himself betting on ELAM as the vehicle to keep him in power. All Turkey has to do is push developments to a point that forces the Greek Cypriot side to take a position, shifting the difficult decisions onto our side and attempting to lead us into a blame game. Erhürman’s presence—as a new politician, BBF supporter—serves this goal. It’s a given, then, that the rhetoric Nikos Christodoulides has adopted throughout the previous period will be tested at the negotiating table. “Tatar or Erhürman—what’s the difference?” may sound catchy, but if that’s the Presidential Palace’s reading too, it’ll prove to be a massive trap. After all, every time we’ve entered talks assuming there’d be no developments or simply aiming to win the PR battle, we’ve found ourselves facing insurmountable dilemmas and backed into a corner. In 2004, Tassos Papadopoulos pushed for a solution on the basis of the Annan Plan, reckoning that Denktaş’s presence guaranteed its rejection by the other side. Denktaş’s removal opened the way for agreement on the plan’s basis, leaving him utterly exposed. Much the same happened with Nicos Anastasiades in 2017. He negotiated until talks reached a striking distance of agreement, and then brought up two states. The events of the past 21 years didn’t simply strip the Greek Cypriot side of the moral high ground it held, mainly thanks to Denktaş. They showed that whenever Turkey shows willingness to engage in talks, it drives things to a point that tests our side.
The Cyprus problem became, especially after 2004, a blame game. With rare exceptions, successive leaders—far from pressures and timeframes—could address domestic audiences and handle Cyprus with PR tricks. The next process, though, can’t be framed as a blame game targeting domestic audiences. Because what’s at stake won’t be the next attempt, but the Cyprus problem itself. What Erhürman is saying—that if talks collapse this time too, the next day can’t be the same—is what’s now being discussed in international circles. That the Cyprus discussion, in case of another shipwreck, can’t continue as is. One more shipwreck, without a clear picture that we did everything we could for a solution, or worse still, with blame attributed to our side, could easily bring closure to efforts to solve the Cyprus problem as we know it. With consequences reaching levels we can barely estimate today.
That’s why Nikos Christodoulides must be ready to negotiate seriously, but above all to negotiate honestly. The Greek Cypriot side can’t afford to be led into yet another shipwreck. Above all, though, it can’t afford to be the one eventually blamed for it. The Cyprus problem is entering a new phase that will bear no resemblance to the first nearly three years of his term. The “Tatar or Erhürman—what’s the difference?” line will soon collapse. If Nikos Christodoulides focuses on domestic audiences or the next elections, he’s most likely to emerge as a tragic hero. Because he won’t find himself facing yet another lost opportunity. He’ll find himself, in all probability, facing permanent partition—with all that entails.
This article was first published on 02.11.2025
Source: THE “TATAR OR ERHÜRMAN—WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE?” LINE WILL SOON COLLAPSE
