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The European Left—in Europe, Greece, and Cyprus alike—seems trapped in a Conservatism vs Progressivism framing. It’s an outdated dichotomy that, under today’s conditions, creates far more problems for the Left invoking it, than for the Right moving conservatively.
From Rome to Warsaw, and from Madrid to Berlin, Europe is lurching towards conservative and nationalist politics. The rise of the Right—in all its guises, from traditional conservatism to the radical far-right—is redrawing the continent’s political map.
Some parties in Cyprus have already joined—or are joining—this battle formation. DISY, with elections ahead, is signalling its targets and priorities through certain political manoeuvres. Worried about haemorrhaging votes to the far-right and specifically to ELAM, it’s launching initiatives it wants to believe will stem the flow. EDEK adopted an anti-federation narrative ages ago—following ELAM’s lead, in the worst possible way.
The migration crisis, fears of lost identity, globalisation fatigue, and economic insecurity following the pandemic and the war in Ukraine are all feeding a political culture eager to invest in “security” and “tradition”. This shift is now apparent in Cyprus too.
In Italy, Giorgia Meloni has legitimised the rhetoric of national pride. In France, Éric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen are dragging the political centre rightward. In Germany, the AfD is smashing popularity records. In Hungary and Poland, orthodox conservatism has already hardened into state ideology.
Meanwhile, even centre-right or liberal governments are adopting more conservative rhetoric to avoid losing voters to their right flank—a phenomenon that defines the core political approach of both Nikos Christodoulides’s Cypriot government, as well as DISY. The “cultural counter-attack” of Europeans is becoming the dominant narrative on gender, education, and migration policy.
This isn’t just an electoral shift. It’s cultural and psychological. It fixates—as already noted—on concepts like “order”, “tradition”, “identity”, and “security”. After two decades of uncertainty, many Europeans are turning towards leaders promising stability and a return to a more familiar past.
European conservatism, however, is far from monolithic. Sometimes it’s liberal and institutional (like Macron or Mitsotakis). Sometimes it’s populist and authoritarian (like Orbán). What unites them is the desire to reclaim “control”—over the economy, borders, and values.
Italy: The Right’s new normality
Giorgia Meloni’s 2022 election marked a turning point. For the first time since the end of World War II, an EU founding member is governed by a party rooted in post-fascism. Yet Meloni doesn’t present herself as “anti-system” but as a guardian of values built on the trinity of Fatherland, Religion, and Family.
Italy now functions as a template for Europe’s so-called “new right”: less extreme in rhetoric, but decidedly conservative in social policy and ruthless on migration. In Cyprus, ELAM has been following and trying to express Meloni’s politics for years, attempting to shed accusations of being a fascist organisation, given that it started as the Cypriot offshoot of the criminal organisation Golden Dawn.
Le Pen’s spectrum
In France, Emmanuel Macron faces a society exhausted by reforms and chronic failures of representation. Marine Le Pen, having long since ditched her father’s political extremism, now presents herself as a champion of Patriotic Realism. Polls already put her on course for victory in 2027. Meanwhile, figures like Éric Zemmour push public discourse even further right, indirectly influencing Macron’s own language. Migration, security, and national identity dominate the political agenda, overshadowing social inequality and climate policy.
This trend is causing serious political paralysis when it comes to assessing the real problems facing EU countries. Both President Nikos Christodoulidis and DIKO, the main party supporting him, present themselves as supporters of patriotic realism. DISY leans towards populism too. Take Cyprus: if there were a rational assessment, climate change—especially water scarcity—would be the dominant issue. With dams empty, water supply to our major tourist cities is becoming problematic, and farmers have already been ordered to stop seasonal cultivation. Instead, ELAM has successfully pushed the notion that migration is one of our biggest problems—at the very moment when, according to Labour Minister Yiannis Panayiotou, the country needs some 300,000 foreign workers to maintain its economic growth trajectory. DISY has now joined this direction with a bill to amend the Criminal Code, enabling court-ordered deportations of foreigners who commit serious crimes. In other words, a single law for all criminals isn’t enough—we need a special law for foreigners!
DISY’s bill effectively bulldozes the positions of Cleisthenes, Isocrates, and Aristotle, who considered equality before the law the foundation of Justice and political equality in a well-governed State.
Germany and the crisis of the Centre
In Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is recording historic highs. What began as a protest party has become a permanent and powerful pole of influence and power, especially in the eastern states. The right-wing Scholz–Greens–Liberals government, and now Friedrich Merz’s government, have proven unable to answer social pressures stemming from the rising cost of living, migration flows, and energy insecurity. Many Germans’ response is a retreat to conservative reflexes—even at the expense of the liberal model that defined post-war Germany.
Orthodox conservatism
Poland and Hungary are already laboratories of European conservatism. Viktor Orbán has established an institutional model of “illiberal democracy”, where national identity and family are placed above minority rights.
Poland’s Law and Justice party (PiS) followed a similar path, elevating Catholicism and anti-migration rhetoric to central pillars of political legitimisation.
Why now?
The conservative turn has deep roots. Europeans feel they’ve lost control of their borders, due to migration flows; of their markets, due to globalisation; and of their identity, due to rapid social change. Amid this uncertainty, conservatism offers psychological security and political simplicity. It proposes clear—often simplistic—answers where liberal democracy offers only complex questions.
The challenge ahead
Europe isn’t turning uniformly right, but it is moving towards a new political realism. Liberal forces must contend not just with the far-right, but with social nostalgia, the yearning for stability, a return to roots, and traditional order. The question is no longer whether conservatism will prevail, but what form it will take: will it be democratic and institutional, or populist with exclusionary tendencies?
The answer will determine Europe’s political future—with the Left, which once held certain balances, seemingly sidelined.
The European Left—in Europe, Greece, and Cyprus alike—seems trapped in an outdated Conservatism vs Progressivism framing. It’s an outdated dichotomy that, under today’s conditions, creates far more problems for the Left invoking it than for the Right moving conservatively. The Right’s narrative is more digestible, unlike the Left’s, which sows confusion. Who is progressive today? Obviously, someone who follows progress—someone who observes, learns, and above all changes and adapts. In which case, progressivism can’t coexist with the Left’s monolithic refusal to change.
Nor does the far-right’s simplistic Fatherland–Religion–Family trinity withstand serious scrutiny. The homeland—as a territorially, culturally, and economically defined and partly limited space—cannot hold up against European integration, nor can it tackle migration flows alone. Religions rest on fake little stories and fairy tales from distant-past farmers and fishermen, functioning today as a process of political lobotomisation of the masses and primarily as a tool for division and fanaticism. Finally, the family—as an institution enduring through time—faces enormous pressure, with low birth rates the greatest challenge. Creating a family requires certain economic preconditions: adequate incomes for young couples, access to a first home, infrastructure for children, and so on.
How can Europe respond?
The EU is becoming more conservative, and some analysts say we may eventually have to accept that the far-right will govern, primarily those who distance themselves from the interwar Fascists and Nazis. Perhaps only then will they change, and more importantly, only then will people understand where we’re headed, since their simplistic proposals demonstrably cannot rise to the complexity of the problems facing the EU. There are some encouraging signs in this direction. In Italy, the far-right brought Meloni to power. Italy hasn’t changed that much. Meloni has. In the Netherlands, far-right MP Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom (PVV) lost to the Liberals under Jetten. The Dutch quickly grasped that a sophisticated European country can’t be governed by slogans.
Politically, socially, and culturally, Europe could respond to the conservative threat primarily through more democracy.
Conservatism (especially far-right populism) draws strength from feelings of exclusion: the idea that the “Brussels elite” ignores citizens. The answer isn’t more technocratic structures but more participation. Conservatism wins when citizens feel insecure—economically and culturally. Europe needs to put its social policy back at the centre: tackle inequality, provide affordable housing for young people, protect work with decent wages, and advance the green transition to gradually lower energy prices—not to serve those investing in it.
Rather than wholesale rejection of conservative narratives about roots, identities, and security, Europe must translate them into genuinely progressive terms:
- Cultural education that unites, not excludes
- An EU with clear processes, less bureaucracy, and more accountability—especially on funding, lobbying, and political responsibility
- Defence of human rights as a European “heritage”
- A new narrative for Europe as a community of values, not just a marketplace
- A European “patriotism of values” against nationalisms
This article was first published on 02.11.2025
