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The five-party meeting has concluded, and the UN Secretary-General is now searching for a new envoy. Judging by the outcome, one might say we are starting Cyprus problem discussions from scratch, as practically the only thing that can be discussed is the implementation of confidence-building measures (CBMs). Reports suggest Maria Angela Holguin will be reappointed, with a meeting with both leaders already announced for early April. Ms Holguin has served for months as Guterres’ personal envoy, understands the problem, and submitted a relevant report with proposals and recommendations to the United Nations in early July 2024.
On 11 July 2024, on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Washington, Ms Holguin held discussions with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, Gerapetritis and Fidan, reaching converging positions on how the Cyprus issue could move forward. EU institutions, represented by Antonio Costa and von der Leyen, expressed their appreciation to Ms Holguin in a letter to the UN Secretary-General “for the work achieved, which was crucial in creating positive momentum.” In short, Ms Holguin could continue pulling the strings on both substance and process after the five-party meeting.
The truth is that neither side wants her in their way, despite the Turkish side now appearing to change its stance. During her brief tenure, the Colombian diplomat showed no inclination to be a mere figurehead in the Cyprus problem but focused on resolving the issue, demonstrating courage and determination, following the examples of De Soto in 2004 and Espen Barth Eide in 2017.
The issue is not personal, just as differences with Espen Barth Eide or De Soto were not personal. Tassos Papadopoulos was ideological but primarily fearful. He rejected the Annan Plan in 2004 because he distrusted the Turks, so he also rejected De Soto as Kofi Annan’s special envoy. Nikos Anastasiades, an exemplary political adventurist, did not want a solution in 2017 because he preferred to be re-elected in 2018. As a master of political amoralism, after his election he wanted to continue selling passports, enriching his family, and holidaying on oligarchs’ jets until the end of his term. Mr Christodoulides falls somewhere between Anastasiades and Tassos, but fortunately for him, there is Ersin Tatar who saves him with his extreme positions. The Greek Cypriot leader does not want Ms Holguin appointed because he does not want anyone bridging the gap between the two sides, nor disrupting his internal narrative that he desires to resume talks from where they left off in 2017, while the intransigent Turkish Cypriots want a two-state solution. With this in mind and the Cyprus issue far from substantive discussion, he believes he will be re-elected in 2028. In reality, both he and his predecessor will be burdened with the permanent partition of Cyprus in a problem that, 50 years on, is already difficult to resolve.
The problem on both sides of the Cyprus issue is greed for Turkish Cypriots, stemming from Turkey’s military strength, and indecisiveness for Greek Cypriots, stemming from a lack of realism. These are mindsets that function as communicating vessels. The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey wanted and gained much from the passage of time: they consolidated the invasion’s fait accompli, increased the population in the north through settlement, economically developed the occupied area, and today are very close to political recognition of their statelet. The Greek Cypriot side, despite developing at tremendous economic rates, politically remained a naive community. It could not accept the defeat of 1974 and never made moves to limit the invasion’s impact, despite the international community giving it a political tool by including the Republic of Cyprus, even halved, in the European Union.
The opportunities
In 2004 and 2017, with the European Union as leverage, two opportunities arose for solving the Cyprus problem, which the Greek Cypriot side threw in the dustbin. From 2021 onwards, when Turkey decided to pivot on the Cyprus issue, things are slowly but steadily moving towards a two-state solution.
This became apparent on 17-18 March at the Geneva five-party meeting. In Switzerland, the basis for negotiations was not clarified, nor was the substance of the Cyprus problem put on the table. What occupied the five-party meeting were generally some confidence-building measures, as if we were in 1974, shortly after the invasion, and not 51 years later.
If something specific emerged, it was setting a date for a new five-party meeting in July and appointing a UN envoy. With Mr Tatar’s Turkish Cypriot side insisting that the new envoy will only manage the implementation of the five agreed CBMs, and the Greek Cypriot side believing the envoy should also address the substance. Based on the above, you can understand what the two sides will be discussing until next July.
The positives
The positive aspect for all sides is that the Cyprus problem is theoretically not at an impasse but in a state of waiting and anticipation in view of broader processes related to the bigger picture of developments in the region. At the same time, what now seems to be adopted as a negotiation vehicle is five-party rather than three-party meetings.
- The Greek Cypriot side and Nikos Christodoulides consider that for the first time since 2017, the impasse in the Cyprus problem has broken, and a new process has begun. They also believe that Cyprus within the EU could manoeuvre to achieve something better than the existing status quo.
- The Turkish Cypriot side gains time until the community elections in October, with the two opposing camps maintaining their positions and narratives. Tatar supports a two-state solution, and Erhurman a return to a BBF solution under conditions.
- Turkey gains time until the international environment clarifies regarding Ukraine, Gaza, and Syria. Turkey is interested in advancing the Greek-Turkish dialogue to deepen its relations with the EU. Greece, as long as there is a process, is not worried about crises in the Aegean. For its part, Europe awaits Trump’s initiatives and the clarification of US foreign policy. Within this context, perhaps the Cyprus problem could also fit somewhere.
Christodoulides-Fidan and European defence
Could Turkey indirectly become a substantial EU partner? Due to Trump, there is currently a shift based on the slogan “Europe-alone,” both from EU European countries and third countries. Could Europe, in this context, become a global power capable of defending itself without US support?
Turkey has much to bring to a negotiating table to become a member of Europe’s defence pillar. It has an enormous army and a NATO-compatible defence industry that can help rearm Europe. Turkey also has extensive war experience from decades of conflicts with the PKK and military involvements in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh in recent years.
Europe certainly cannot but be cautious towards Turkey since it is a given that it will attempt to join to reap political benefits. As many European countries have experienced (see Sweden and Finland’s accession) within NATO, Turkey is a difficult and demanding ally. Ankara frequently uses its veto right to promote its domestic and foreign policy agendas. If decisions regarding a European army require unanimity, as in NATO, Turkey will take the same stance. Europe should not exclude Turkey from its security plans but should insist that in this context, it cannot transfer its bilateral problems with European states like Greece and Cyprus into the alliance. Before its entry, these issues must be settled. Nikos Christodoulides, in his 20-minute meeting with Hakan Fidan, promised that Cyprus would not be an obstacle to Turkey’s potential inclusion in a European defence mechanism. This is not enough if the Cypriot President is unwilling to make concessions on the Cyprus problem. On the other hand, Turkey cannot ask to protect Europe without resolving a huge contradiction on its part, which has to do with occupying 36% of the territory of European Cyprus.
This article was originally published on 23.03.2025
