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Erhürman’s two tables and Yılmaz’s two states outline the course of the Cyprus issue in 2026…
Looking ahead to the new year with optimism about the Cyprus problem is one thing—and it’s not wrong. After all, nothing gets done without optimism.
But here’s the other thing: we need to position matters with pragmatism and realism, so that justified and beneficial optimism doesn’t morph into naive and damaging optimism.
In a previous piece, we examined the most significant developments on the Cyprus problem month by month throughout 2025.
If we had to take away anything from these first days of 2026, it would be Tufan Erhürman’s positioning on the Cyprus issue process (particularly his statements on 15/01), as well as the remarks by Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, who visited the occupied territories on 16/01.
The new Turkish Cypriot leader, on January 15, delivered an extensive commentary on Cyprus, approaching it along two axes: the process itself and energy issues.
Regarding the process, he made it crystal clear yet again that he doesn’t agree with an Expanded Conference unless various issues are resolved first—checkpoints, the halloumi issue—whilst repeating the four preconditions he’s set for talks to resume.
At the same time, he distinguished between the negotiating table and the talks table (or ‘the discussions table’).
And as he put it: “The table we’re sitting at right now is the talks table. Within this table’s framework, the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for the Cyprus issue, María Holguín, came previously. We met twice. We met with the President of southern Cyprus, Nikos Christodoulides. Our representatives continue discussions at a lower level. In this context, we’ve drawn up a 10-point package of proposals. Work on this continues. We’ve submitted our proposals for facilitating trade through the Green Line Regulation, easing checkpoints, EU citizenship rights for children born from mixed marriages, and resolving the problems these individuals face when crossing to the south. For us to be able to sell halloumi in the EU, there’s an agreement that the southern side needs to sign. We’ve been waiting for that signature for three years. Christodoulides promised before the UN that ‘the matter will be resolved by 31 January’. He also agreed to facilitate passage at the checkpoints in Deryneia and Zodia [editor’s note: Astromeritis area]. We’re waiting for these issues to be finalised before the next meeting. There’s a possibility Holguín will return at the end of the month. Before Holguín comes, we need to sort out certain issues between ourselves.“
Then he spoke about the negotiating table. Erhürman said the problem in Nicosia must first be resolved before participating in 5+1 format meetings like those held in Geneva, which have proved fruitless.
As he noted, a meeting with the participation of the guarantor powers shouldn’t be required for issues like opening checkpoints.
“Two leaders who can’t even find a solution for a roadblock can’t go around claiming they’re pursuing a solution to the Cyprus problem,” he said, arguing that this is now the lens through which the issue is viewed at the UN as well.
On energy matters, Tufan Erhürman also left an implicit but unmistakable threat towards Cyprus, Israel and Greece: if the three countries attempt to interconnect via an undersea electricity cable, then Turkey will use the means at its disposal, as he put it, to stop that interconnection. “If the Republic of Cyprus, Israel and Greece attempt to connect amongst themselves with an undersea electricity cable and exclude northern Cyprus and Turkey, then Turkey will deploy the means it possesses and won’t allow it,” he said specifically, before moving on to the hydrocarbons issue, saying the same applies there, stating that “in areas where Turkey and Turkish Cypriots claim rights, there cannot be a unilateral process.“
He said the same things, more succinctly, in his statements in the presence of the Turkish Vice President, focusing his remarks on the theme of ‘Political Equality’, saying that Turkish Cypriots, as one of the two equal founding partners, have equal sovereign rights, and conveying that “no tolerance will be shown for the violation of these rights on the field.”
For his part, Cevdet Yılmaz was more explicit and repeated yet again the solution framework for Cyprus. What a shock—the two-state solution.
The sovereignty rights of Turkish Cypriots are non-negotiable, he said, adding that “Those who cannot digest the concept of equal sovereignty should not speak of a solution.“
He emphasised that in Cyprus there are “two separate states and two separate peoples” and that any rhetoric ignoring this “reality” is invalid. He also noted that the existence of two states doesn’t preclude cooperation, accusing the Greek Cypriot side of lacking willingness.
Cevdet Yılmaz told us, moreover, that Greek Cypriots too should be delighted (!!!) with the presence of the Turkish army in Cyprus, claiming that the army’s presence “brings stability and security to the island”—something that, he said, benefits both sides.
So it’s crystal clear what one should expect in 2026 on the Cyprus problem.
A difficult 2026 with honeyed words and promising approaches which, however, crash against the framework Ankara has set and continues to set. The two-state solution, or the disguised two-state solution.
And we haven’t even talked about Guarantees and Security yet.
How much realistic optimism can there possibly be?
This article was first published on 18.01.2026
