Two polls in recent weeks have shown ELAM losing ground. The latest poll by Kathimerini puts the far-right party down 1.6 percentage points from the previous survey (at 12.6% from 14.2%), while Sigma also records a fall, (to 11% from 12% in March and February). All other polls point, at the very least, to a slump in the party’s numbers. In some of them, its hold on third place is even under threat.
Until recently, ELAM seemed to be riding a huge wave of momentum. Flows from DISY, thanks in part to Christodoulides, and its image as an anti-system party in a political climate dominated by rage and contempt for the traditional establishment, had kept the far-right party on a steady upward path. At a time when Alma and Direct Democracy were not yet part of the party landscape, its numbers appeared to have no ceiling. As the main vehicle for the protest vote, it managed to hold on to a solid core of voters while also expanding its appeal towards the centre-right. At the same time, it seemed to benefit from the relationship it developed with Nikos Christodoulides, gaining both members and access to the President’s support base. There were quite a few who spoke of a momentum that could even take the party beyond third place. The question, then, is why this enormous momentum ELAM had been displaying is now being reversed or curbed, leaving it, in the best-case scenario, looking as though it has hit its ceiling.
One important reason is the new political environment, which appears to be affecting ELAM just as it is affecting all the other traditional parties. Where ELAM had been the main voice of the “anti-system”, the arrival of additional options split that vote, with three or even four parties, if Volt is included, now competing for it. As a result, the growth of the anti-systemic vote did not translate into a further rise for ELAM. On the contrary, that vote was largely harvested by the new formations, which not only foregrounded the anti-systemic or extra-systemic message but embodied it. Alma defined itself as the party standing against corruption, while Direct Democracy presented itself as the force that would punish the system and give citizens their voice back.
At the same time, ELAM’s political slide was also driven by choices and moves that created the image of a thoroughly establishment party. Throughout the previous period, ELAM invested heavily in its anti-system character and managed to be seen by a large section of society as the party standing against the system. It was society’s anger at that system, and to a far lesser extent ELAM’s own positions, that increased its appeal. The rumoured relationship with the President, and its broader rhetoric towards the government, called into question not only its anti-system character but its very place on the political map. It stopped being convincing as an option outside the system. Then came videogate, which shifted ELAM from supposed enemy of the system to its biggest defender. Its response, weaker even than that of the parties supporting the government, was the crowning moment of a trajectory that tied it to the executive. Nor did its anti-system narrative gain anything from the inclusion on its ballot of several figures who until recently were in other establishment parties, or who are very close to the President, such as Marios Pelekanos, Evgenios Hamboullas and Andreas Papacharalambous. Today, while ELAM appears to be picking up Christodoulides-aligned DISY voters and retaining the vast majority of its hard core, it is losing, as a result of this turn, part of its softer core vote.
It is clear that ELAM is entering the final stretch under pressure from both DISY, which is seeking to bring votes back home, and from the parties that have taken its place on the anti-systemic map. More importantly, though, it enters the final stretch under enormous pressure over the day after. It will have difficult decisions to make after the election, and above all ahead of the presidential race. Is it politically realistic for it to support Nikos Christodoulides from the first round? And if it chooses to go with Nikos Christodoulides, will the party’s hard core follow — especially that 5% to 8% that backed it because of its stance against the system? What happens if it decides to go with its own president? Will those close to Nikos Christodoulides follow Christos Christou? How will these two currents inside the party coexist? And, above all, what narrative can ELAM put forward to avoid splitting apart the day after?
By way of a footnote: At a time when the polls themselves are also being questioned, pollsters need to explain how two surveys conducted (less than) two months apart, and without any major developments in between, can show the President’s positive image differing by 15 points (33% in Sigma, 48% in Kathimerini). They also need to answer whether there is a conflict of interest. Especially when it is clear that this is being politically exploited and serves a specific political narrative, since a number of ministers rushed to highlight the fact that Nikos Christodoulides is currently the politician with the highest positive rating. Only then will polls be able to regain their credibility.
This article was first published on 10.05.2026
Source: ELAM’S DAY AFTER
