President Tufan Erhürman’s speech at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum last weekend drew both criticism and praise from various segments of society.
While the speech was applauded by the country’s most ardent advocates of the status quo, it was, unfortunately, far from praiseworthy for those seeking a federal solution.
After days of ongoing debates and praise, our esteemed professor, believing it necessary to enlighten us mortals, broke his silence the other day and issued a statement, saying, “Our will for a solution, our phased approach, and our methodology are understood by everyone.”
There is no way that ‘everyone’ understands the Antalya speech and the methodology—a speech that half the public liked and at least the other half watched with high blood pressure. On the contrary, we can say that his speech is yet another example of how the wheat and the chaff are skillfully mixed together.
For instance, this: “What are the rights of the Turkish Cypriot people? Is the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus currently a state with a judiciary, a parliament, an executive branch, and a presidency? Yes. Does the fact that it is not recognized anywhere else besides the Republic of Turkey negate its status as a state? No. But the sovereignty rights of the Turkish Cypriot people—who constitute the population of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—are being violated right now.”
In other words: We have rights in the partnership state, the Republic of Cyprus, and these rights belong to us. Furthermore, we separated from that state and established another state upon the property of our partners within that same state—this state also belongs to us. Our reckless partners in the partnership state, who refuse to accept this situation, are complaining about it and violating our rights.
In short, what belongs to the Greek Cypriots is my property, and what belongs to me is also my property.
To put it plainly, there is a state here; this is the second state on the island, and I will claim its rights by force if I must. So, at some point, thinking along the lines of, “I’m working toward a two-state solution, not for a federation I’ve never even mentioned,” is by no means malicious.
On the other hand, the definition of a “state” is outlined in the 1933 Montevideo Convention. The state described above is in conflict with nearly all four conditions set forth in that convention.
A state, as a subject of international law, must possess the following characteristics: (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) a legitimate government, and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The entity that he defines as a state is a structure with disputed territory, a disputed population, a disputed legitimate government, and, most importantly, lacks the capacity to establish external relations. Whether it is even recognized by Turkey is a matter of debate!
The reason for this unrecognized status was the move to secede from the 1960 federation through the collaboration of Rauf Denktaş and Dr. Fazıl Küçük, first seeking autonomy and then establishing a state. (1967 Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration, 1975- Turkish Federated State of Cyprus)
This maneuver was supposedly ‘crowned’ in 1983—including by Turkey’s newly elected government (Özal-ANAP)—with a ‘fait accompli’, and the fate of Turkish Cypriots has unfortunately changed.
Tufan Erhürman is also aware of this situation, which clearly contradicts UN Resolution 186.
In his political life prior to being elected, he repeated the phrase “The TRNC will not be recognized unless UN resolutions are thrown in the trash” millions of times.
However, perhaps due to the wisdom of the seat he now occupies, he now speaks of ‘forcibly’ securing the rights of the very state he once claimed would never be recognized.
He does this by citing the rights of Turkish Cypriots within the Republic of Cyprus, as if these rights were granting us the authority to establish a new, separatist state.
Another contradictory aspect of his speech is his reference to the veto right held by Turkish Cypriots in 1960.
On the one hand, in the same tone as the unforgettable line “under no circumstances” from the soap opera, “Magnificent Suleiman” [Editor’s note: reference to the popular Turkish soap opera, ‘Magnificent Suleiman’], he says he will not accept that Turkish Cypriots cannot ever become a president in the new state to be established; on the other hand, by pointing to the veto authority of the vice-presidential position—which was to remain in place forever under the 1960 arrangement—and targeting the agreements made by Christodoulides, this makes me think: How beautifully he mixes the wheat with the chaff! While he speaks of ‘equal founding partners’, ‘political equality’, and ‘our rights from 1960’, we’ve reached the point where the TRNC is being stripped of its rights!
Indeed, these sentiments of mine are further reinforced by the following statements he made:
“For example, there is a federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and there is also one in the United States.
No one who understands this matter could look at them and say that they are the same. Switzerland was originally established as a confederation. However, today, it is referred to as a federation in the literature.
Let’s look at unitary states in some places. The unitary state of the Republic of Turkey, the unitary state in Spain—with regional administrations in the latter. Can you compare the unitary state in Turkey to the regional administrations in Spain? That’s why, rather than getting hung up on these names, I’m focused on my people’s rights.”
It is true that the U.S. and the Bosnian federation are not the same thing. The foundation processes and historical background of the two countries are very different.
However, they are built upon an identical structure: Both federations have a central government and subordinate units.
At this point, what we call the ‘center’ is the common federal state at the very top.
The U.S. federation is founded upon a ‘union’, and the federal government at the top is structured from the bottom up.
The structure in Bosnia, however, is a type of federation that is designed to maintain balance and prevent conflict; in political literature, it is described as a ‘balance that manages separation’. The 1995 Dayton Agreement forms the foundation of this federation.
Now, it is essential to understand this: The federal structure in the U.S. envisions ‘power-sharing within a single nation’. The structure in Bosnia, however, is one formed ‘between ethnic groups’.
It has already been understood, quite simply, that the desired federation in Cyprus will not be of the U.S. type—it is described as a ‘two-community, two-region’ model (77-79 Summit Agreements). Furthermore, these two aspects have already become permanent following the intervention of 1974.
Therefore, the federation we seek is a federal solution that prevents and balances inter-ethnic conflict, and its most crucial aspect is, of course, political equality.
The point where we diverge from our professor is not only that the TRNC state (in its current form and as it is so heavily controlled by Turkey) is being considered as one pillar of the federation to be established, but also that the fact that this state was founded upon land seized by the force of arms from the citizens of the other state, and distributed like spoils is being overlooked.
As if that weren’t enough, they are demanding that our rights in the republic we have separated from be labeled as ‘human rights violations’.
I do not believe even Rauf Denktaş, one of the chief architects of the island’s division, went this far.
While he strongly defended TRNC, Denktaş was not so carried away as to demand a passport from the Republic of Cyprus, or hold them accountable for the international agreements they had made!
Because Denktaş was a man who very clearly stated that he did not want a solution on the island, that the solution had come in 1974, that the borders were drawn with bayonets, and who defended this stance. Therefore, while referring to the TRNC as a state, he would not fall into the contradiction of saying, “I also want my rights in the state I separated from.” Clear!
Tufan Erhürman, on the other hand, is someone who doesn’t know what he wants, wavering between a two-state solution and a federation, and—in the manner we mock—demanding the ‘Süleyman model’, which is a solution that is fundamentally at odds with the other.
Even though he emphasized a solution in the interview he gave to TAK yesterday, there is no clarity regarding what form this solution might take.
What is more, he also said, “My people want a solution too.” Yes, for example, as a member of the public, I want a solution based on federation. Some of my friends want a two-state solution. I know people who consider annexation as a solution. As you can see, we all want a solution, but our most critical difference lies in what the solution model should look like. Therefore, clarity is important. Without clarity, everyone applauds you, and a grand, populist cacophony emerges.
Finally, I’d like to address those who, when we criticize him, offer such advice like, “Well, what did you expect? Wasn’t it obvious what he’d do?”
It’s true, he says, “I’m doing exactly what I said I would during the campaign”—and that’s exactly what he’s doing.
His stance before the campaign was exactly the same. We knew that too.
In October 2025, we went to the polls and voted for him and elected him. Knowingly.
Therefore, we have no choice but to endure the consequences of our choice.
He is someone I oppose not personally but on principle, and indeed, on these points, we are both steadfastly walking our respective paths.
Yet, to state it clearly once again, I would like to reiterate that I will be the strongest supporter of the steps he takes toward a federal solution.
I don’t have much hope, but since ‘words fade, but writing endures’, I am making a note of this here.
This article was originally published on 23.04.2026
