When failure is anticipated, optimism risks becoming an alibi.
When it comes to the Cyprus problem, we have become deeply familiar with a peculiar political paradox: declarations of optimism can multiply even as the chances of progress remain fragile. Every meeting is presented as an opportunity, every proposal as proof of initiative, and every possible failure comes with the explanation prepared in advance — that our side wanted progress, but the other side failed to respond. What is rarely explained is what exactly the leadership did to secure the agreement it says it wants, what risks it identified, and how it tried to address them.
Reports in Politis over the past few days have described a specific possibility: four crossing points, at Mia Milia, on the Athienou–Aglantzia link via Pyroi, at Louroujina–Lympia and in the Kambos–Karavostasi area. Together with demining, such a package could create the conditions for the next step in the process. But consultations and convergences are not the same thing as a final agreement, however often public discussion skips over that crucial gap.
Into this fragile setting comes the advance notice of a Greek Navtex for the resumption of surveys linked to the Great Sea Interconnector. Athens has confirmed that its issuance is imminent, while Politis reported the strong reaction in Turkish media to remarks by Giorgos Gerapetritis about an operational response should there be any attempt to obstruct the work. Precision matters here: the reaction of the Turkish press does not automatically amount to an official decision by Ankara on the crossing points. It does, however, reflect an environment in which the prospect of an agreement becomes more precarious.
This is where reports that President Christodoulides was proclaiming his positive stance on the crossing points while already aware of the impending Greek announcement — and expecting a negative Turkish reaction — acquire particular significance. If confirmed, the question that arises is more serious than yet another miscalculation. Was the President genuinely trying to use the available window for agreement, or was it enough for him merely to have his consent placed on record, in the expectation that the Turkish reaction would spare him the test of actually implementing it?
Information that still requires verification cannot be treated as proof of intent. But a specific answer can, and should, be demanded: when was Nicosia informed of the Greek plans, what assessment did it make of the possible impact on Holguín’s efforts, and what consultations took place beforehand? Invoking coordination between Athens and Nicosia has meaning only when it includes an assessment of the consequences and a strategy for managing the risks. Otherwise, it is reduced to a ritual reassurance — useful in public statements, inadequate when critical decisions have to be made.
Turkey, of course, bears full responsibility for any decision to link Cypriots’ freedom of movement with the dispute over the electricity cable. People’s movements cannot legitimately be turned into leverage for other objectives. But precisely for that reason, our own leadership has an obligation to show how it is working to prevent such a linkage. Anticipating a negative Turkish reaction creates an obligation for diplomatic effort. It is not enough merely to prepare the explanation that will be offered after failure.
If there really was a window for agreement, basic political responsibility required an effort to lock in the areas of convergence, clarify what remained unresolved and shield the process from outside shocks. With what text? What timetable? What practical steps? What coordination with the United Nations? These are the measures of political will. A general declaration that “I am positive” costs very little, especially when the person making it believes there is a good chance he will never have to confront the reactions that a real agreement would bring.
There is also the internal test of consistency. Communities in Tillyria say the President had committed not to move ahead with other openings unless the Kokkina crossing was also advanced, and they are objecting to the possibility of it being replaced by the Kambos route. That claim requires a clear response from the President. It nevertheless shows how easily assurances given to different audiences can create expectations that no negotiation can satisfy simultaneously. And when that happens, it is citizens who bear the cost.
Because crossing points affect everyday lives: journeys to work, access to services, family contact, economic activity and opportunities for communication between the two communities. The fact that negotiations over their opening have dragged on for months should itself raise concerns about the ability to deliver even limited, practical results. When every practical arrangement becomes a test of national prestige, inertia becomes permanent. The leaders keep their arguments intact, while people keep waiting in the same queues, in front of the same barriers.
Holguín’s effort will ultimately be judged by whether it leaves behind commitments that can actually be implemented, and a credible path towards negotiations. If this opportunity is lost as well, any search for responsibility must examine the entire sequence of moves and decisions. Who proposed what? Who accepted which terms? When did new obstacles emerge, and what was done to overcome them? Diplomatic confidentiality protects a negotiation while it is under way. It cannot become a permanent shield against accountability for its outcome.
Christodoulides will ultimately be judged on whether his positive stance produces open crossings and a path towards negotiations. If the reports that a Turkish reaction had already been anticipated are accurate, he must explain what steps he took to prove that prediction wrong. Otherwise, his optimism risks being read as preparation for an alibi.
And Cyprus has already paid far too high a price for a political culture in which those in power regard it as a success merely to prove that the other side is to blame, while partition continues, undisturbed, to create new facts on the ground.
Source: THE ALIBI BEFORE THE SHIPWRECK
