The Cyprus issue has—in many cases—served as a tool for partisan political expediency during election campaigns
Although the indications are limited and contradictory for the time being, it appears that the President’s “pre-election” reference to serious developments on the horizon regarding the Cyprus issue had—and still has—some basis in reality. Antonio Guterres appears ready to play his final card before stepping down permanently from his position as UN Secretary-General in December. What that will be remains to be seen after Angela Olguín concludes her talks.
The key question, however, is whether—and to what extent—we are ready for a new—and decisive—initiative on the Cyprus issue. The “significant developments,” and even the possible “solution plan” mentioned by President Christodoulides, will be a double-edged sword for him. Because, let’s not forget, all of this is unfolding not in a vacuum but during an election campaign, ahead of the 2028 presidential election.
On the one hand, given the political circumstances that shaped the results of the parliamentary elections, the Cyprus issue could be a strong card in Mr. Christodoulides’s current bid to run for the presidency again. At the same time, however, the Cyprus issue has—in many cases—served as a tool for partisan expediency during election campaigns. DISY and Glafcos Clerides derailed the prospects of the Gali Proposals during the Vassiliou era, AKEL and Tassos Papadopoulos scuttled the Annan Plan during the Glafkos Clerides era. In both cases, the desire for power took precedence over the prospects for resolving the problem. Even Averof Neophytou’s stated willingness to support the President if he moves forward on the Cyprus issue should not be taken for granted, as his handling of the matter may be called into question down the line.
What does a President do in the face of such circumstances? Does he weigh the pros and cons and calculate the political costs of each option? Does he count votes with an eye toward the next election? Or does he decide to move forward regardless of how many—and who—will follow him down the path he believes is right for the country and its future? In the first case, he acts as a politician; in the second, as a leader. The choice will be his.
However, responsibility for potential developments in the Cyprus issue lies not only with the President but also with the political forces. Will DISY add the President’s actions to its long list of criticisms, thereby building its own election campaign? Or will it act as a responsible force—as it claims to be—by supporting what may be the last attempt to resolve our national problem? Will AKEL repeat the pattern of 2003 by once again betting on the prospect of power, or will it—this time—follow through on the commitments it makes in meetings with its Turkish Cypriot partners? And here, each party will be judged by its choices.
It is a given that the Cyprus problem will not be resolved unless the island’s two major political forces reach a historic consensus that highlights the prospects for the future rather than the fear-driven reactions that will undoubtedly be exploited by all those forces that have definitively opted for the “second-best solution.” For this to happen, plans for 2028 must be set aside in the Political Bureaus, and whatever developments emerge in the coming months regarding the Cyprus issue must be taken into account.
For, despite the insistence of those who fail to see the missed opportunities along the long path of the Cyprus issue, our national cause has often been sacrificed on the altar of presidential elections.
