Fifty-two years after the invasion and nine years after the collapse of Crans Montana, the Cyprus problem appears to be entering a new phase of activity which, regardless of its eventual outcome, can no longer be treated as yet another repetition of the familiar cycle of expectations and disappointment.
The moves by the United Nations, the return of María Ángela Holguín with a mandate to prepare a new “five-plus-one” conference, and the visible personal engagement of António Guterres together create a different picture from the one that prevailed in previous years.
The United Nations’ Secretary-General is now in the final six months of his term, which ends in December 2026. It is no secret that he would like to conclude his tenure at the organisation with a positive development on Cyprus, where his mandate effectively began with the failure of Crans Montana. His ambition is not simply to convene yet another meeting. It is to set the process on a path towards a settlement and, if possible, to bring it to completion before he leaves office.
The question is whether the current circumstances will still exist in six months or a year. The history of the Cyprus problem shows that windows of opportunity do not remain open indefinitely. Today, for the first time in nine years, Ankara appears willing to accept the launch of a new process. Tufan Erhürman speaks openly about negotiations aimed at a settlement, while even more cautious observers acknowledge that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan does not view a new initiative negatively.
No one knows whether this stance will remain unchanged. The region is in a period of intense geopolitical fluidity. The wars in the Middle East, new energy arrangements, shifting relations between Europe and Turkey, and broader realignments in the international system all create an environment that could either support an agreement or, equally easily, lead to renewed tensions. Those who assume that today’s conditions will automatically persist tomorrow may be underestimating the speed at which the world around us is changing.
Particularly significant is the increased involvement of the European Union. António Guterres’ contacts with the European Union leadership and Brussels’ intention to play a more active role are not a procedural detail. On the contrary, they may prove to be one of the key elements of the process. The European Union can provide political and economic incentives, ensure alignment with the acquis communautaire, and help shape a security framework that addresses the concerns of both communities.
It is precisely here that the discussion on security becomes central. For decades, the issue of guarantees and military presence has been one of the main obstacles to a settlement. Today, however, the reality is different. Cyprus is a member of the European Union, and the European security architecture is itself undergoing redesign. At the same time, closer European Union–NATO cooperation is creating new conditions.
It should not be considered taboo to discuss the possibility that a Cyprus settlement could be accompanied by the reunified island’s integration into NATO, or by a broader Euro-Atlantic security arrangement. Such a prospect would not automatically resolve all issues, but it could provide a new framework that renders outdated the logic of guarantor powers inherited from the previous century. Cypriot society must be able to examine these options seriously, without fear or ideological rigidity.
The same applies to the discussion on implementation. The idea of a gradual, phased implementation of any agreement — allowing both communities to see tangible benefits of reunification in practice — deserves attention. The experience of 2004 showed that referendums often become arenas for expressing fears and insecurities. If certain elements of an agreement are implemented step by step and positive outcomes become visible, different conditions for a final popular verdict may emerge.
Of course, no process guarantees success. Significant disagreements, mistrust and political obstacles remain. But the greatest mistake would be to respond to the new initiative with indifference or fatalism. Stagnation is not a neutral option. Each passing year entrenches the status quo, widens the distance between the two communities and makes a settlement more difficult.
This is why the current debate may be more important than many before it. It concerns not only negotiators, leaders or international organisations, but society itself. It concerns whether Cypriots are prepared to consider new ideas, weigh realities soberly and decide whether they wish to continue living in a divided homeland or attempt a different course.
Fifty-two years after the events of 1974, Cyprus continues to carry open wounds relating to independence, democracy, security and the free movement of its people. There may be no perfect solution. But there is a need to pursue a viable one. And the coming six months may offer an opportunity that is not guaranteed to appear again soon.
