Is there a way to break the Cyprus problem deadlock and revive a process that has been stalled for six whole years? There is, as I was reading yesterday in Phileleftheros’ leading article. It is the proposal of the President of the Republic, Nikos Christodoulides, for a more active involvement of the European Union in the process of resolving the Cyprus problem. “Nicosia’s proposal seems today to be the only one that can generate any prospects,” it stressed, while warning that “the Cyprus problem deadlock is being consolidated.” But, “support is needed for the implementation” of Nicosia’s proposal, which “seems today to be the only one that can generate any prospects.”
How will it generate the desired prospects? [Phileleftheros] responds: “President Christodoulides, in line with what he had also stated during his election campaign, will seek the substantial, hands-on, engagement, involvement of the European Union in the Cyprus problem.” The EU, “by assuming a leading role, always within the framework of the United Nations, can, indeed, create the conditions so that all involved parties can perceive the benefits that will result from a solution to the Cyprus problem.”
So, there you have it, that’s how prospects will be created. The EU will make it so that all involved parties will perceive the benefits that will result from a solution to the Cyprus problem. Didn’t the EU, represented by Commission Vice President Federica Mogherini at Crans-Montana in 2017, arrange for all stakeholders to perceive the benefits of the solution? Which of the involved parties did not perceive the benefits? And which benefits were not perceived? In 2016, at Mont Pèlerin, when the President of the Commission himself, Jean-Claude Juncker, was present, and when Akinci even presented a map for the return of Famagusta and Morphou, which involved parties and which benefits were not perceived? How come Juncker did not make it so that we and the Turks perceive the benefits?
In 2004, the EU’s involvement in the Cyprus problem was as substantial as practically possible. In practice, it couldn’t have been any more [substantial]. The benefits of a solution were staring us in the face. How much more direct involvement and invaluable benefits [could it have offered] after the EU committed itself to bringing a United Cyprus Republic into its ranks simultaneously with a Cyprus solution? But the current president, just like Phileleftheros and their ilk, did not limit themselves to warnings, “beware of Danaans [Greeks] bearing gifts”. They rejected the benefits with a resounding “no”, lest they leave the slightest chance of their implementation in practice.
Source: THE PROPOSAL AND THE DANAANS