There’s an old and tried-and-tested method for when you don’t want to say ‘no’, but don’t want to say a clear ‘yes’ either: you keep moving the goalposts. This is very aptly pointed out by my dear friend Larkos Larkou. Whenever the moment of decision draws near, you add a new condition, change a previous interpretation, or discover a new point of disagreement. And, above all, you proclaim that you are absolutely ready to go ahead.
This is precisely the impression conveyed today by Nikos Christodoulides’ policy on the Cyprus issue. The President states that, if progress is made by the time of the United Nations General Assembly, the way will be paved for a new 5+1 round. At the same time, he downplays the importance of confidence-building measures, saying that progress on these measures is not a prerequisite for the expanded meeting.
Except that António Guterres said something different. Following his meetings in Nicosia, he was clear: a new 5+1 meeting will be convened following adequate preparation regarding the CBMs, the methodology and the substance, taking into account the convergences that have already been achieved. This is not a matter of wording. It concerns the philosophy behind the next round of talks. And because some in Nicosia may have felt that the Secretary-General’s words were open to creative interpretation, his spokesperson, Stéphane Dujarric, reiterated: any 5+1 meeting must be properly prepared, and this requires serious discussions. María Ángela Holguín is even clearer: without progress on the CBMs, it is very difficult to convene an expanded session. Three voices from the United Nations. One line. And facing them, Nicosia insists: ‘We are ready’. Ready, however, for what?
For yet another conference to prove that we are talking? Or for substantive negotiations, building on the enormous body of convergence achieved up to Crans-Montana? Because that is where the crux of the matter lies. The United Nations does not need a lesson on what happened in 2017. It was there. Guterres himself chaired the proceedings. The UN has the minutes, the proposals, the points of convergence – thousands of pages of negotiating material.
And the Secretary-General has noted that at Crans-Montana there was ‘in essence, the substance of a comprehensive settlement’ and that the parties came close to a strategic understanding on both security and guarantees and on the other key elements of the solution.
Nikos Christodoulides himself has, moreover, acknowledged this. In 2023, addressing the European Parliament, he stated that the EU’s presence had contributed decisively to achieving numerous points of convergence and to bringing us very close to a solution in 2017.
Now, however, a new version is emerging. Speaking in the presence of the President of the European Council, António Costa, the President stated that ‘on many of the issues’ there are not points of convergence but ‘disagreements and divergences’, and that the solution to these lies in the European acquis.
This is precisely where the goalposts are being moved. It is one thing to say that the final solution to the Cyprus problem must be compatible with the European acquis – something that goes without saying for an EU Member State – and quite another to use the acquis today as a mechanism to reopen issues on which negotiations have already produced convergence.
After all, the European Union was involved in the process. Juncker had appointed Peter Van Nuffel as his personal envoy back in 2015 precisely to ensure that whatever was agreed was compatible with the acquis communautaire. Juncker himself took part in the Geneva talks, whilst Federica Mogherini attended those in Crans-Montana. So what exactly did we discover in 2026 that we did not know in 2017? The answer may lie in the forthcoming codification by the United Nations of the negotiating acquis up to Crans-Montana. Because such a document drastically limits everyone’s ability to rewrite history according to the political needs of the moment.
And that is perhaps what is troubling. This is not a new practice. We saw it under Anastasiades: a different reading of the Guterres Framework, different dates, different interpretations. Until, in Berlin in November 2019, in the presence of the Secretary-General himself, Anastasiades and Akinci reaffirmed the Guterres Framework of 30 June 2017. The United Nations appears unwilling to go through the same process again. Guterres’s message is essentially simple: if a new attempt is to be made, this time we must know what we are negotiating, on what basis and using what methodology. Not yet another conference for the sake of photographs and press releases.
Espen Barth Eide had warned as far back as 2017 about something that now sounds almost prophetic: these processes take time, and if that time is not used wisely, it may be lost. Nine years on, that time has almost run out. Nikos Christodoulides may continue to claim that he is ready. But true readiness is not measured by statements. It is measured by acceptance of the agreed negotiating framework, by the political will for the major give-and-take, and by the decision to finally stop moving the goalposts. Because we can keep shifting our position back and forth until nobody understands exactly what we are seeking. Except that now, not even the ‘fools’ are fools. And, above all, there is no time left for games.
