By This post is also available in: ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ (GREEK) TÜRKÇE (TURKISH)
The much-publicised journey of the Republic of Cyprus towards joining the Schengen Zone is being promoted with enthusiasm by both the government and the opposition as a step towards security, normalisation and European integration. In practice, however, it operates within the logic of geopolitical “unilateralism” which, rather than serving the national interest, may entrench the division and undermine the state itself.
The implementation of the strict controls required by the Schengen Treaty at Green Line crossing points raises serious questions. The process involves customs checks, identity verification with biometric data, pushbacks and prevention of illegal crossings. In other words, practically establishing borders within the country itself. Is this to the benefit of the Republic of Cyprus or ultimately to the benefit of the de facto division and the entity in the occupied areas?
The Green Line is 180 kilometres long. Its surveillance, if it is to align with Schengen requirements, presupposes policy realignment and the creation of infrastructure that applies to state borders. This reality is not a matter of technicalities —it is deeply political. UNFICYP is already in conflict with the Christodoulides government over arbitrary practices of pushing back refugees, as the UN recognises the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus in the buffer zone. Meanwhile, questions arise regarding Turkish Cypriots living in the occupied areas: who will be considered eligible for crossing, how will their Cypriot citizenship be recognised, what will apply to children of mixed marriages or Turkish nationals living with family ties in Cyprus?
At the crossing points, the Turkish Cypriot administration has already installed signs bearing the words “Border Gate”. The message is clear: any strengthening of control from the Greek Cypriot side “legitimises” the narrative of a separate state’s existence. The government shows no inclination to handle the issue with political sensitivity. The president’s refusal to open the four new crossings, despite the relevant agreement under UN auspices, demonstrates an awkward if not negative approach.
The example of European accession illustrates what national strategy means. But then there was responsible leadership with a plan, cross-party consensus and international pressure on Turkey. Today, the presidency invokes security “for our citizens” but settles for rhetoric. It ignores that security is not built with obstacles and barriers between Cypriots themselves, nor is it served by decisions that consolidate dividing lines.
Schengen can be a tool. But without political cohesion and a reunification prospect, it risks becoming a border. And if the prospect of reunification is abandoned, then the problem will not be technical—it will be existential for the state itself.
This article was first published on 02.06.2026
Source: SCHENGEN FOR HALF OF CYPRUS?
